The Poverty of Good Intentions:
The Failure of Foreign Aid
BY PIOTR BRZEZINSKI
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The former Secretary of the Treasury, Paul
O’Neil, was lambasted as a myopic rube when he suggested
that “trillions of dollars of aid” have had “precious
little” impact on developing nations. His argument certainly
fell on deaf ears; organizations from the World
Bank to the UN continue to plead for more aid, and
President Bush, showing the compassionate side of his
conservatism, promises to increase American aid by $5
billion a year. Amid this avalanche of good intentions, we
should ask ourselves if foreign-aid profligacy actually
leads to positive results—namely, poverty reduction and
economic development. Unfortunately, the answer is no.
The massive post-World War II edifice of international
foreign aid has manifestly failed to lead to selfsustaining
economic growth in most of the Third World.
As a 1993 Clinton administration task force put it,“despite decades of foreign assistance, most of Africa
and parts of Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East
are economically worse off today than they were 20 years
ago.” Meanwhile, the few countries that have achieved
dramatic economic growth did so without the benefit of
generous foreign aid. In the 1960s, per-capita GDP in
East Asia was lower than in sub-Saharan Africa, but now–although it never received much foreign aid–East Asia
is fast approaching Western levels of GDP per capita.
Similarly, China and India are rapidly escaping poverty,
and both countries have received negligible amounts of
aid relative to GDP. In successful developing nations,
economic progress has been the result of domestic policies
and institutions, not outside aid interventions.
The ineffectiveness of aid is partly a result of aid
agencies’ bureaucratic structure. They use a classic central-planning framework: vast information requirements,
arbitrary benchmarks, weak feedback, and total
disregard for cost-benefit ratios. As the Soviet Union’s
failure showed, this is not a recipe for success.
Furthermore, the political nature of aid leads agencies to
focus on big round-number aid pledges and glamorous
new capital investments, neglecting the unceremonious
needs of post-project maintenance. The result is the
rapid depreciation, disuse, and waste of aid investments.
Under the guiding lights of bureaucracy and political
preferences, aid agencies dot developing nations with
white elephant infrastructures that go misused, unused,
and abused.
Donors’ good intentions notwithstanding, foreign
aid actually keeps people trapped in poverty, because it
sustains governments’ poor economic policies. U.S. aid
currently supports governments with protectionist tariffs
and quotas, import-substitution schemes, heavily
subsidized boondoggles, exchange-rate controls, nationalized
industries, price and wage controls, severe budgetary
imbalances, and inflationary monetary policies. In
these countries, aid props up the very governments that
are enforcing policies that condemn their citizens to
poverty. Thus, the World Bank study “Assessing Aid:
What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why” found that a 1-percent-of-GDP aid allotment to a country with bad
policies appears to slow growth by 0.3 percent per annum.
Furthermore, by directing money into government
hands, aid enshrines corrupt ruling elites and enables lavish
patronage. Because most aid to governments is stolen
by corrupt elites, aid tends to increase consumption
rather than investment and to expand the size of government
without conferring benefits for the poor (as
indicated in a 1997 study of over 95 countries by Peter
Boone of the London School of Economics). In Peter
Bauer’s words, aid amounts to a wealth transfer “from
poor people in rich countries to rich people in poor
countries.” In the process, aid sustains the harsh rule of
repressive governments; nearly half the countries ranked“repressed” or mostly unfree” in the Heritage
Foundation “Index of Economic Freedom” are recipients
of U.S. foreign aid.
Instead of seeking succor from richer nations,
developing countries should try to stop strangling themselves
with red tape. As the World Bank report “Doing
Business in 2005” shows, businesses in developing
nations face triple the administrative costs and double
the bureaucratic regulations as businesses in rich countries.
Although well-meaning, these strands of red tape
have perverse effects. For example, minimum-wage laws,
intended to raise living standards, actually create unemployment
by requiring employers to choose between firing
a worker—or never hiring him—on the one hand, or,
on the other hand, paying him a legally mandated wage
that is higher than the revenue the worker brings in. Not
a difficult choice.
In the aggregate, the layers of such well-meaning
regulations have astoundingly bad effects. In Angola, it
takes about 146 days to deal with the regulations necessary
to open a business; in Haiti, 203 days. In Burkina
Faso, it takes 150 percent of the average person’s earnings
to pay for complying with business-opening regulations,
and in Chad more than 300 percent.
Poor countries can help themselves simply by abolishing
such regulations. The “Doing Business in 2005”
report estimates that a country’s jump from the most- to
the least-regulated quartile would boost its annual
growth by 2.2 percent. The aforementioned Economic
Freedom Index reveals that there is a clear association
between economic freedom and GDP per capita; across
the board, the more a country improved its economic
freedom score from 1997 to 2004, the more economic
growth it experienced.
On their part, instead of pledging more foreign aid,
developed nations should cut trade barriers. According
to OECD reports, freeing trade would open opportunities
for poorer nations worth twice as much as all foreign
aid combined. Oxfam estimates that a 1 percent increase
in Africa’s share of world exports would produce in
income more than five times the continent’s foreign-aid
receipts. Rich countries can also liberalize immigration
laws, reducing population pressures in underdeveloped
nations and increasing remittances sent home.
If poor countries wish to emulate the success of
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, they must establish
pro-growth economic policies; without the right conditions
for economic development, no amount of aid will
magically produce economic growth. But in foreign aid, it
seems that intentions count for far more than results.
There is little evidence that, after 50 years without success,
developed nations have recognized foreign aid as the
ineffective and often-pernicious failure that it is.
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Piotr Brzezinski is a second-year Social Studies concentrator
at Harvard. |
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